OpenBao, Azure and Windows distribution
In 0.20.0, Vault KV v2, OpenBao KV v2 and Azure Key Vault Secrets support Linux distribution with matching API, worker and agent releases. Shared Windows/IIS material deployment, independent Linux staging and exact-version Vault/OpenBao cleanup remain gated.
Start the right journey
As a workspace manager or administrator, choose Share one certificate across servers in the setup guide. Complete host configuration, installation and the signed no-op before queuing real work. Then complete Configure material store and Connect and validate consumers. A saved form or submitted job is not deployment evidence. Keep addresses, credentials, DNS secrets, private bundles and host destinations on customer hosts.
OpenBao KV v2
Choose OpenBao KV v2, provider openbao-kv2, an HTTPS listener, KV v2 mount and the local CA file. Follow agent authentication with OpenBao Agent/bao equivalents. Give every host a distinct AppRole and protected renewable token sink: issuer create/read on the exact group bundle prefix, consumer read only, scanner no bundle access. Namespaces, KV v1 and PKI are unsupported here.
Stop the issuer before allocation, or hold the job unapproved under workspace policy. Apply the returned group UUID and scoped policy, then restart with real execution enabled. Publication uses CAS=0; consumers fetch pinned version 1, never latest.
Azure Key Vault Secrets
Choose Azure Key Vault Secrets (azure-key-vault) and use a dedicated Secrets vault in public Azure. A private endpoint can use the normal vault hostname with private DNS and a trusted TLS chain. Certificates-only objects and non-exportable HSM keys cannot supply a shared private bundle.
Configure a renewable token-file, managed-identity on an Azure VM with IMDS (optionally selecting a user-assigned clientId), or workload-identity with a protected assertion file. Give the issuer get, read-metadata and set permissions and give each consumer read permission on its approved secret. Keep delete, purge and recovery administration separate. Verify the exact 32-hex secret version. After an uncertain write, restore read access and retry the original intent.
Windows Server and IIS
Shared import remains qualification-gated; local CNG enrollment is separate. Follow the Windows installer: IIS Management Scripts/Tools, PowerShell 5.1, .NET 4.8 and the native LocalSystem agent. Create the exact HTTPS site/binding first. Use windows-material-iis-v1, a machine personal store, explicit service SIDs and all required IP/port/SNI probes. Imported keys are non-exportable with protected ACLs. Generic file delivery, Centralized Certificate Store and shared selectors are rejected.
Append the binding UUID and target.reference to top-level declaredTargetSelectors; policy.allowedTargetSelectors alone is insufficient. Preserve other targets and protected Windows state. RSA and EC P-256/P-384 are supported; P-521 is rejected before import. Use trust assurance and a local issuer CA file; installed-only assurance belongs to Linux files.
Verify and recover
Linux service reload requires polkit JavaScript-rule support, such as Ubuntu 24.04; file-only delivery does not. Follow the Linux installer. Check each consumer's exact desired/observed version, generation, fingerprint and freshness in Certificates → certificate → Deployments. Installation alone never proves a service loaded the certificate. Every configured listener must pass served/trust verification; test an offline required consumer too. Distribution stays manual unless a manager explicitly enables a reviewed automation policy.
For uncertain Windows activation, preserve state and inspect CNG, IIS, HTTP.sys and TLS. The local certops-reconcile-binding <binding UUID> command is read-only. After the original intent matches, retry that job and resume its authorized rollout. Rollback needs a new authorized generation selecting retained material.
The Core distribution runbook contains the full configuration reference. Its qualification guide distinguishes live evidence from production enablement.