Core audit event reference
Use this catalog to interpret an event after filtering or exporting audit history. It describes Core events inherited by Enterprise; Enterprise SSO and licensing add their own events. Cloud has a separate catalog, including Cloud-specific action names.
Event catalog
CertOps issuer and enrollment events use canonical CERTOPS_ISSUER_* and CERTOPS_ENROLLMENT_* names. Historical dotted names are normalized for reads and filters without rewriting stored events. The viewer-readable workspace feed redacts deployment topology; managers and administrators retain access to those details.
- CERTOPS_ISSUER_CREATED metadata:
{ issuerId, kind } - CERTOPS_ISSUER_PREFLIGHT_DISPATCHED metadata:
{ issuerId, jobId, agentId } - CERTOPS_ISSUER_KEY_CONFIRMED metadata:
{ issuerId, version, caKeySha256 } - CERTOPS_ENROLLMENT_CREATED metadata:
{ enrollmentId, issuerId, jobId } - CERTOPS_ENROLLMENT_RECONCILE_PROPOSED metadata:
{ enrollmentId, requestId } - CERTOPS_ENROLLMENT_CANCELLED / CERTOPS_ENROLLMENT_ABANDONED metadata:
{ enrollmentId } - CERTOPS_AGENT_LOG_REJECTED metadata:
{ agentId, jobId, claimId, code }
Each event records "occurredAt", "actor_user_id", "subject_user_id", "action", "target_type", "target_id", "channel", "metadata", and "workspace_id" (when applicable).
Two properties of the catalog are worth knowing before you read it:
- Some events have no user actor. Agents, executors, controllers and background workers are machine principals, and
actor_user_idreferences a user, so those events recordactor_user_id: nulland identify the acting machine inmetadatainstead (for exampleagentIdorapiTokenId). An empty actor column is expected on those rows, not missing data. target_idis an integer column. CertOps entities are identified by UUID, so their ids live inmetadata(for examplemanagedCertificateId,jobId,profileId) andtarget_idis left null. When searching for everything that happened to one certificate, search the metadata, nottarget_id.
Authentication
- LOGIN_SUCCESS metadata:
{ method } - LOGIN_SUCCESS_2FA metadata:
{ method } - LOGIN_FAILED metadata:
{ email, reason } - LOGOUT
- REGISTRATION metadata:
{ method }.methodis"invite_token"when the account was created by accepting a workspace invitation, or"self_signup"otherwise. - TWO_FACTOR_ENABLED
- TWO_FACTOR_DISABLED
- EMAIL_VERIFICATION_SENT
- EMAIL_VERIFICATION_RESENT
- EMAIL_VERIFICATION_FAILED
- EMAIL_VERIFIED
- PASSWORD_RESET_REQUESTED
- PASSWORD_RESET_COMPLETED
- PASSWORD_CHANGED
Workspace & RBAC
- WORKSPACE_CREATED metadata:
{ name, kind } - WORKSPACE_RENAMED metadata:
{ before.name, after.name } - WORKSPACE_DELETED
- MEMBER_INVITED_OR_UPDATED metadata:
{ role, email, workspace_name, recipient_type }. Emitted synchronously when an invitation or direct membership is created.recipient_typeis"existing_user"when the email already has a TokenTimer account (membership created directly) or"invitation"when a pending invitation row was written for a new email. - INVITE_EMAIL_SENT metadata:
{ role, email, workspace_name }. Emitted only after the invitation email was handed off to the SMTP transport successfully. Absence of this event after MEMBER_INVITED_OR_UPDATED means the email step failed and the operator should check mail logs. - INVITATION_CANCELLED metadata:
{ email, role, workspace_name, invitation_id }. Emitted when a pending invitation is removed viaDELETE /api/v1/workspaces/:id/invitations/:invitationId. Accepted invitations are never cancelled by this endpoint. - MEMBER_ROLE_CHANGED metadata:
{ role } - MEMBER_REMOVED
- WORKSPACE_MEMBERSHIP_ACCEPTED
- WORKSPACE_ALERT_SETTINGS_UPDATED
- SYSTEM_ADMIN_CHANGED metadata:
{ is_admin }. Instance-level (not workspace-scoped); recorded when a platform administrator grants or revokes another user's admin flag.
Tokens
- TOKEN_CREATED metadata:
{ name, type, category } - TOKEN_UPDATED metadata:
{ fields, changes } - TOKEN_DELETED metadata:
{ name, reason }; deletions performed by obsolete-token cleanup also include{ location, provider }and usereason: "import_cleanup"(manual imports) orreason: "auto_sync_cleanup"(auto-sync runs) - TOKENS_TRANSFERRED_BETWEEN_WORKSPACES
- TOKENS_REASSIGNED_CONTACT_GROUP
Contacts & WhatsApp
- WORKSPACE_CONTACT_CREATED metadata:
{ contact_id, phone_masked } - WORKSPACE_CONTACT_UPDATED metadata:
{ contact_id, fields_updated } - WORKSPACE_CONTACT_DELETED metadata:
{ contact_id } - WHATSAPP_TEST_SENT
- WHATSAPP_TEST_SENT_TEMPLATE
- WHATSAPP_TEST_FAILED
- WHATSAPP_TEST_FAILED_TEMPLATE
- WHATSAPP_TEST_RATE_LIMITED
- WHATSAPP_TEST_ERROR
Alert delivery
- ALERT_QUEUED metadata:
{ daysUntil, threshold, dueDate } - ALERT_CHANNELS_UPDATED metadata:
{ alertKey, from, to } - ALERT_NOT_QUEUED_NO_CHANNEL metadata:
{ reason } - ALERT_SENT metadata:
{ days, channels } - ALERT_SEND_FAILED metadata:
{ days, error, attempts } - ALERT_PARTIAL_SUCCESS metadata:
{ channel, errors } - ALERT_RETRY_SCHEDULED metadata:
{ days, next_attempt_at, remaining_channels } - ALERT_BLOCKED_MAX_ATTEMPTS metadata:
{ days, attempts_email, attempts_webhooks, attempts_whatsapp } - ALERT_BLOCKED_WHATSAPP_ERROR metadata:
{ days } - ALERT_MANUAL_RETRY
- WEEKLY_DIGEST_SENT metadata:
{ contact_group_id, contact_group_name, tokens_count, channels, week_start_date }
System operations
- ALERTS_BULK_REQUEUED
- WHATSAPP_TEST_SENT and related test events
User settings & integrations
- ALERT_PREFS_UPDATED metadata:
{ fields_updated } - INTEGRATION_SCAN metadata:
{ provider, region, success, tokens_found } - INTEGRATION_DETECT_REGIONS metadata:
{ provider, regions_found } - TOKEN_IMPORTED metadata:
{ source, name, type } - TOKENS_IMPORTED metadata:
{ source, count, method }
Auto-Sync
- AUTO_SYNC_CREATED metadata:
{ provider, frequency, timezone } - AUTO_SYNC_UPDATED metadata:
{ provider, fields_updated } - AUTO_SYNC_DELETED metadata:
{ provider } - AUTO_SYNC_TRIGGERED metadata:
{ provider } - AUTO_SYNC_FAILED metadata:
{ provider, error }. Emitted by the worker when a scheduled sync run fails; checkerrorand the worker logs for the underlying cause.
CertOps
- CERTOPS_API_TOKEN_CREATED metadata:
{ api_token_id, token_prefix, name, scopes, status, expires_at }. Emitted when a workspace manager or admin creates a machine API token for a CertOps executor, from the Machine API tokens panel orPOST .../certops/tokens. - CERTOPS_API_TOKEN_REVOKED metadata:
{ api_token_id, token_prefix, name, scopes, status, revoked_at }. Revoking a token that was also being monitored as an SSL token still records a separateTOKEN_DELETEDevent for that side effect. - CERTOPS_CERTIFICATE_REGISTERED / CERTOPS_CERTIFICATE_IMPORTED metadata:
{ source, count, certificate_ids, fingerprints_sha256 }.sourceis"api"for CertOps API registrations (event nameCERTOPS_CERTIFICATE_REGISTERED) or"import"for dashboard PEM imports (event nameCERTOPS_CERTIFICATE_IMPORTED). - CERTOPS_CERTIFICATE_ISSUED metadata:
{ managedCertificateId, commonName, jobId, operation, source, agentId, fingerprintSha256, serialNumber, issuer, notAfter, subjectAltNames, deployedCertPath, targetType, windowsStore, windowsBindingSite, windowsBindingPort, windowsBindingSniHost, profileId, profileDerivationReason }. Emitted the moment a certificate TokenTimer ordered actually exists: the agent's verify-step evidence has been accepted, the certificate is promoted fromprovisioningtoactive, and its real expiry is known. Written in the same transaction as the promotion, so an active certificate always has this event.operationis"issue"for a first issuance and"renew"for a retry against a certificate that had not reconciled. There is no user actor because the agent is a machine principal;agentIdnames the agent that did the work.deployedCertPathis always null for awindows-iistarget (its destination is a Windows certificate store + IIS binding, not a file, per thewindows-iistarget);targetType: "windows-iis"plus the fourwindows*fields are the substitute, naming the store and the exact IIS site/port/SNI host the certificate was bound to.targetTypeisnullfor a target shape without an explicittype(older job payloads). - CERTOPS_CERTIFICATE_ISSUANCE_UNRECONCILED metadata:
{ managedCertificateId, commonName, jobId, operation, claimId, agentId, reconciliationReason, targetType, windowsStore, windowsBindingSite, windowsBindingPort, windowsBindingSniHost }. Emitted when a job reported success but its certificate could not be promoted, so the certificate is not usable and will not renew.reconciliationReasonis one ofno_claim_bound_verify_evidence,verify_evidence_missing_fingerprint,verify_evidence_missing_expiry. The reason is also stored on the certificate row, but that column only shows its latest value; this event is where the history of failed attempts survives. Thewindows*fields (present only whentargetTypeis"windows-iis") name the store/site/port/SNI host the failed issuance was attempting to bind to. See Reconciling interrupted jobs. - CERTOPS_CERTIFICATE_RENEWAL_UNRECONCILED metadata: same shape as
CERTOPS_CERTIFICATE_ISSUANCE_UNRECONCILEDabove. Emitted on the renewal-side equivalent failure: arenewjob against an already-activecertificate reported success, but the agent's claim-bound verify evidence was missing, incomplete, or unfingerprinted, sonot_after/fingerprintSha256could not be refreshed. Left unaddressed, the renewal scheduler's idempotency key (certificate id +not_after) keeps colliding with the same already-succeeded job on every later sweep, so a certificate can stay genuinely due for renewal indefinitely while every sweep reports nothing wrong; this event and the row'sreconciliationReasonare what make that visible. - CERTOPS_CERTIFICATE_RETIRED metadata:
{ managedCertificateId, tokenId, status, reason, fingerprintSha256 }. - CERTOPS_JOB_CREATED_MANUAL metadata:
{ operation, subjectType, subjectId, source, targetType, windowsStore, windowsBindingSite, windowsBindingPort, windowsBindingSniHost }. Emitted when a workspace manager creates an executor job manually from the dashboard orPOST .../certops/jobs.sourceis always"api". Thewindows*fields (present only whentargetTypeis"windows-iis") name the store and IIS site/port/SNI host the manual job targets. - CERTOPS_JOB_CREATED_AUTOMATIC metadata:
{ jobId, operation, mode, subjectType, subjectId, commonName, notAfter, profileId, source, trigger, targetType, windowsStore, windowsBindingSite, windowsBindingPort, windowsBindingSniHost }. The unattended counterpart of the event above: emitted when the renewal scheduler creates a renewal nobody asked for.sourceis always"automation"andtriggeris"renewal_scheduler". Idempotent replays create no job and therefore no event, so the count of these events is the count of renewals actually scheduled. Thewindows*fields (present only whentargetTypeis"windows-iis") name the store and IIS site/port/SNI host the scheduled renewal targets. - CERTOPS_JOB_FAILED metadata:
{ jobId, operation, jobStatus, source, mode, agentId, claimId, errorCode, errorMessage, subjectType, subjectId, needsOperatorReconciliation, reconciliationReason, targetType, windowsStore, windowsBindingSite, windowsBindingPort, windowsBindingSniHost }. Emitted when an agent reports a terminal non-success (failed,rejected,cancelled,orphaned_unknown_effect). Successful jobs are not audited individually:CERTOPS_CERTIFICATE_ISSUEDalready records the outcome that changes state, and a row per successful renewal per certificate would bury the failures.needsOperatorReconciliation: truemeans the job's real-world effect is unknown and somebody has to look.errorMessageis scrubbed of private key material and generic secrets before it is stored. Thewindows*fields (present only whentargetTypeis"windows-iis") name the store/site/port/SNI host the failed job was targeting. - CERTOPS_EXECUTOR_EVENT_ACCEPTED metadata:
{ apiTokenId, executorEventId, eventType, jobId, logId, status, evidenceIds }. Emitted for every accepted job lifecycle event posted by a CertOps executor (agent) using a machine API token. - CERTOPS_EVIDENCE_ACCEPTED metadata: same fields as
CERTOPS_EXECUTOR_EVENT_ACCEPTED. Emitted alongside it whenever the accepted event carried one or more evidence items. - CERTOPS_EVIDENCE_REJECTED metadata:
{ apiTokenId, jobId, eventId, eventType, rejectionCode, routeFamily }. Emitted when submitted evidence fails validation or is too large, or when it contains private key material (rejectionCode: PRIVATE_KEY_MATERIAL_REJECTED). - CERTOPS_KEY_MATERIAL_REJECTED: emitted whenever a request is rejected because it contained private key material; TokenTimer never accepts or stores private keys. Two call sites, two metadata shapes: dashboard/API requests via middleware use
{ code: "PRIVATE_KEY_MATERIAL_REJECTED", method, path, body_type }; CertOps executor events (machine token) use{ code: "PRIVATE_KEY_MATERIAL_REJECTED", method, routeFamily, apiTokenId }. - CERTOPS_GENERIC_SECRET_REDACTION_APPLIED metadata:
{ ...executor event fields, redactionApplied: true, redactionCount, redactedFields }. Emitted when an executor event's free-text fields (for example command output) matched a generic secret pattern and were redacted before storage.
Agents and the execution plane
These events cover the native TokenTimer agent (as opposed to the external executor path above).
- CERTOPS_AGENT_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN_CREATED metadata:
{ bootstrap_token_id, token_prefix, name, status, expires_at }. Emitted when an admin mints a single-usettboot_token to enroll an agent. The token value itself is never in the audit trail, only its prefix. - CERTOPS_AGENT_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN_REVOKED metadata:
{ bootstrap_token_id, token_prefix, name, status, revoked_at }. A successful enrollment consumes the token rather than revoking it, so a used token produces no revocation event; theCERTOPS_AGENT_REGISTEREDevent below is where a spent token is accounted for. - CERTOPS_AGENT_REGISTERED metadata:
{ agentId, hostname, platform, agentVersion, protocolVersion, credentialPrefix, bootstrapTokenId, signingKeyId, declaredTargetSelectors, declaredCommandProfileNames, declaredCapabilities }. Emitted when an agent enrolls, which is the moment a new machine principal gains the right to run commands on hosts in this workspace.declaredTargetSelectorsanddeclaredCommandProfileNamesare the scope the agent claimed, and are only ever sent at registration, so this event is the only record of what it asked for.declaredCapabilitiesis where a Windows agent'swindows-cert-store-v1/iis-binding-v1strings first appear (see Install an agent (Windows)); a Linux agent's list typically has neither. The credential is returned to the agent exactly once and never appears here;credentialPrefixidentifies it. A retried registration that replays the original response is not audited a second time, so one enrollment is always one event. - CERTOPS_AGENT_CAPABILITIES_CHANGED metadata:
{ agentId, previousCapabilities, declaredCapabilities }.declaredCapabilitiesis re-advertised on every heartbeat so an in-place agent upgrade can pick up new capabilities without re-enrollment.declaredTargetSelectorsstays register-only; it is not re-sent on heartbeat. This event fires only when the declared capability set itself actually differs from what is already on file, for example after upgrading a Windows agent's build and picking upwindows-cert-store-v1/iis-binding-v1for the first time, or downgrading and losing them. An ordinary heartbeat with an unchanged capability set produces no event at all; there is deliberately noCERTOPS_AGENT_HEARTBEATevent, since heartbeats are frequent and a row for every one of them would swamp the log with nothing to act on. DiffpreviousCapabilitiesagainstdeclaredCapabilitiesto see exactly what was gained or lost. - CERTOPS_AGENT_RETIRED metadata:
{ agentId, force, reason, leasedJobs }, plus{ cancelledJobIds, orphanedJobIds }when the retirement fenced in-flight work. A forced retirement (force: true) is the case worth reviewing:orphanedJobIdslists jobs whose real-world effect is unknown because the agent was removed mid-execution, which is the same state described in Reconciling interrupted jobs. Any fenced job that was arenewalso raises acert_renewal_failedalert, through the same durable outbox intent as an agent-reported or lease-reaped failure, so a forced retirement mid-renewal reaches your alert channels and not only this audit row. - CERTOPS_KEY_MATERIAL_REJECTED also fires on the agent routes, with
{ code: "PRIVATE_KEY_MATERIAL_REJECTED", method, routeFamily: "agent-protocol", agentId }andtargetType: "certops_agent". An agent should never send key material, so this event on an agent route means either a misbuilt custom client or a tampered agent. It is written with no actor user, since the caller is a machine.
Trust anchors
Events for the trust-anchor distribute/revoke workflow: pushing a private CA certificate into an agent's OS trust store and safely removing it later. Distribute/revoke jobs go through the same claim/lease/result lifecycle as certificate jobs, so CERTOPS_JOB_FAILED above still covers a terminal failure; the events below cover the trust-anchor-specific side effects that failure path doesn't.
- CERTOPS_TRUST_ANCHOR_APPROVED metadata:
{ trustAnchorId, fingerprintSha256, anchorType, name }. Emitted when a CA certificate is registered as a trust anchor (POST .../certops/trust-anchors). Re-submitting the same fingerprint reactivates and updates the existing row rather than creating a duplicate; that replay is still audited, so a reactivation is visible even though no newtrustAnchorIdwas created. - CERTOPS_TRUST_ANCHOR_RETIRED metadata:
{ trustAnchorId, fingerprintSha256, anchorType, reason }(reasonpresent only when the caller supplied one). Emitted when an anchor is retired (POST .../certops/trust-anchors/:anchorId/retire), blocking newdistribute-trustjobs from targeting it. Retiring does not itself remove any already-installed material; a retired anchor's existing installations still need their ownrevoke-trustjobs, each producing its ownCERTOPS_TRUST_ANCHOR_REVOKEDevent below. Retiring an already-retired anchor is idempotent and audited again on each call. - CERTOPS_TRUST_DISTRIBUTE_JOB_CREATED / CERTOPS_TRUST_REVOKE_JOB_CREATED metadata:
{ jobId, trustAnchorId, anchorName, fingerprintSha256, agentId, store, host, owner, transitionGeneration }. Emitted when a manualdistribute-trust/revoke-trustjob is actually created against an agent's trust-anchor installation row (POST .../certops/jobs); the event name matches theoperationon the request.storeis the OS trust-store label the anchor'sanchorTyperesolves to, never caller-supplied.owneris the caller-supplied identifier the job's ownership reference is tracked under (see Ownership and multi-owner installs). An idempotent replay of the same request creates no new job and therefore no second event. - CERTOPS_TRUST_ANCHOR_DISTRIBUTED / CERTOPS_TRUST_ANCHOR_REVOKED metadata:
{ jobId, trustAnchorId, installationId, store, host, owner, transitionState, provenance, agentId, outcome, mutationPerformed, failureCategory, observedFingerprintBefore, observedFingerprintAfter }. Emitted when the agent reports adistribute-trust/revoke-trustjob assucceeded, mirroring howCERTOPS_CERTIFICATE_ISSUEDfires only on the transition that actually changed a host's state; a terminal failure usesCERTOPS_JOB_FAILEDinstead, not this event.outcome,mutationPerformed,failureCategory, and the twoobservedFingerprint*fields are carried straight from the agent's own reported trust-result payload (not just derived from the installation row afterward), so this event records what the agent says it actually observed and did on the host, not only where the row ended up. There is no user actor: the agent is a machine principal. - CERTOPS_TRUST_REFERENCE_RELEASED metadata:
{ trustAnchorId, anchorName, fingerprintSha256, agentId, store, host, owner, transitionGeneration }. Emitted on arevoke-trustrequest when another owner's reference to the same host/store/fingerprint tuple is still live: this owner's reference row is marked released, but the OS trust store is never touched and no job is dispatched to the agent at all, since removing the certificate would break the still-dependent owner. See Ownership and multi-owner installs for the two-owner example this event corresponds to.